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Abstract
Global governance is frequently criticised because of major legitimacy deficits, including lack of public accountability and
democratic control. Within this context, questions about the legitimacy of non-state governance actors, such as non-
governmental organizations, transnational corporations and private security companies, are neither an exception nor a
surprise. Many actors have, therefore, turned to the measurement of performance, defined as publicly beneficial out-
comes, in order to gain legitimacy. However, the rise of performance assessments as legitimizing practice is not without
problems. Taking global security and health interventions as examples, this article contends that the immaterial, socially
constructed and inherently contested nature of such public goods presents major obstacles for the assessment of perfor-
mance in terms of observable, measurable and attributable outcomes. Performance is therefore frequently replaced by
performativity, i.e. a focus on the repetitive enactment of specific forms of behaviour and capabilities, which are simply
equated with the intended results. The implications for how global public goods are conceptualized and, ultimately, imple-
mented are profound.
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1. Introduction
Critiques of a legitimacy deficit in global governance
have increased in recent years. Not only governments
but also non-state actors engaged in global governance
have been accused of insufficient public accountability
and control (e.g. Review of International Political Econ-
omy, 2011). Specifically, the delegation of global gover-
nance to private actors, such as non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), transnational corporations and Private
Security Companies (PSCs), has raised questions over
the legitimacy of these actors and their growing roles
(e.g. Lister, 2003; Østensen, 2011). Private governance
actors frequently lack so-called ‘input’ legitimacy due to
their limited accountability, transparency and public par-
ticipation in organizational decision-making. Many have
therefore turned to the measurement of performance,
defined as publicly beneficial outcomes, to gain ‘out-
put’ legitimacy. In fact, performance assessments have
emerged as a key standard for legitimacy among state
and non-state actors (e.g. Fowler, 1996; Martin & Ket-
tner, 1997; Radin, 2007).
However, the rise of performance measurement as
legitimizing practice is not without problems. This article
contends that the immaterial, socially constructed and in-
herently contested nature of some public goods, such as
security, health or development, presents major obsta-
cles for performance assessment in terms of observable,
measurable and attributable outcomes. Performance is
therefore frequently replaced by performativity, i.e. the
repetitive enactment of specific forms of behaviour and
capabilities, which are simply equated with the intended
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outcomes. The implications of this development are con-
siderable. They affect not only the legitimacy but also
the conceptualization, implementation and local experi-
ences of global governance interventions. In contrast to
other studies which have investigated the use and suc-
cess of legitimization strategies (Joachim & Schneiker,
2012; Østensen, 2011), this article focuses on the po-
tential consequences (see also Lewis, 2015). Specifically,
the following analysis seeks to understand the way in
which the performative turn in performance measure-
ment shapes how public goods are conceptualized, and
accordingly implemented, in global governance.
While performance assessments are applied across a
wide range of global governance actors and fields, this
article looks at two examples in particular: security and
health. Using the recent international intervention in
Afghanistan as an illustration, it observes that private ac-
tors have become key agents of global governance. In
the field of security governance, the US Department of
Defense (DoD) has hired Private Security Companies to
support the international peace and stability operation
in the country. In the field of health governance, NGOs
have received funds from the World Bank, the European
Union (EU) and the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) to increase the health of the
Afghan population. In both fields, governments and in-
ternational organizations have employed performance-
based contracting and performancemeasurements to le-
gitimize the delegation of (public) service functions to
non-state actors vis-à-vis the Afghan government and
population, their own constituencies and donors, or na-
tional and international public opinion. They have ar-
gued that performance standards help to demonstrate
effectiveness, ensure public accountability and gener-
ate legitimacy (Sondorp, Palmer, Strong, & Wali, 2009,
p. 141). This article aims to show that, despite vast differ-
ences between security and health governance, we can
observe a shift from performance outcomes to perfor-
mative acts in both fields—with comparable detrimental
consequences for how these public goods are conceptu-
alized and implemented.
2. Legitimacy and Performance Measurement
Legitimacy refers to the generalized perception or as-
sumption that an entity or the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and defi-
nitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Since legitimacy is fre-
quently contested it is better understood as a social pro-
cess in which social actors use various strategies to gain,
maintain and repair legitimacy (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridge-
way, 2006; Suchman, 1995). Legitimization strategies can
build on a plethora of measures and resources, including
status, authority, participatory institutions, norms, habit
and outputs (Johnson et al., 2006; Scharpf, 1998). The
theoretical differentiation between input and output le-
gitimacy is important for understanding the popularity of
performance assessments.1
Fritz Scharpf was the first to make the distinction
between input legitimacy and output legitimacy with
regard to public policy making. According to Scharpf
(1998, p. 2), input legitimacy derives from ‘government
by the people’ meaning that ‘collectively binding deci-
sions should originate from the authentic expression of
the preferences of the constituency in question’. Output
legitimacy, in contrast, results from ‘government for the
people’, i.e. the notion that ‘collectively binding decisions
should serve the common interest of the constituency’
(Scharpf, 1998, p. 2). Since the common interest is diffi-
cult to define output legitimacy has been frequently as-
sociated with the effectiveness and performance of poli-
cies, rules and regulations (Scharpf, 2009, p. 177).
The contemporary popularity of output legitimacy
and performance measurements as key standards for
global governance can be linked to two historical de-
velopments. The first development being the prolifera-
tion of transnational policy concerns and the associated
functional expansion of international organizations and
global governance interventions which frequently lack
input legitimacy from local constituencies. It was in the
context of European Union studies that Fritz Scharpf pro-
posed his distinction between input and output legiti-
macy, arguing that the EU should concentrate on out-
put legitimacy because its ability to gain input legitimacy
from democratic participation in decision-making was
limited by the absence of a united European identity and
populace. Demands for improved legitimacy and public
accountability have also affected other international or-
ganizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World
Trade Organization (Glenn, 2008; Take, 2012). Not even
NGOs have been exempt from critical questions regard-
ing the legitimacy, accountability and transparency of
their governance contributions (Lister, 2003). Although
some attempts have been made by international orga-
nizations to improve their input legitimacy by reforming
their voting systems, the decision-making structures of
many global governance actors remain biased in favour
of a small number of Western member states or donors
(Glenn, 2008).
The second development has been the ascent of Ne-
oliberalism and New Public Management (NPM) as in-
ternational economic and political ideologies. These ide-
ologies have advocated the ‘small state’ and public out-
sourcing, arguing that the legitimacy of governmental
and non-governmental actors can be best demonstrated
by means of regular performance assessments. Jenny
1 Since legitimacy is a concern in many disciplines there exists no uniform terminology. The terms ‘procedural’ or ‘throughput’ legitimacy are sometimes
used instead of or as components of input legitimacy, whereas ‘substantive’ or ‘pragmatic’ legitimacy also denote output legitimacy (see e.g. Suchman,
1995, p. 579; Wallner, 2008, p. 424). Moral legitimacy which ‘reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activities’ (Suchman,
1995, p. 579) is sometimes separated from these forms, while other authors argue that normative assessments are inherent in definitions of input and
output legitimacy.
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Lewis (2015) traces the politics and consequences of the
emergence of performance measurements in detail. She
writes, ‘Since the 1970s, interest in measuring perfor-
mance has increased, alongside concerns about public
sector expenditure and the advent of NPM. Performance
measurement is high on the agenda of governments in
many nations, as they seek to demonstrate that the or-
ganisations and individuals that they fund and manage,
even at one or more steps removed, are doing what they
are mandated to do’ (Lewis, 2015, p.1)
Over the past three decades, many national, inter-
national and non-state actors, including the US gov-
ernment, the World Bank and a multitude of interna-
tional humanitarian organizations, have thus adopted
performance-based contracting and implemented per-
formance measurement systems to provide legitimacy
for themselves and for the delegation of governance
activities to private actors, such as NGOs and PSCs
(Lynch-Cerullo & Cooney, 2011; Radin, 2007; Spar &
Dail, 2002). These actors initially defined performance
as the cost-efficient provision of public services (Mar-
tin & Kettner, 1997, p. 17). However, cost-efficiency has
proven difficult to assess and obtain. Since the 1990s,
performance measurement has therefore focussed on
outcomes as a key measure, rather than cost-efficiency.
Common to these systems is the assertion that perfor-
mance should be assessed in terms of publicly benefi-
cial results, i.e. ‘outcomes’, and not merely the supply
of services, i.e. ‘outputs’. In the US, the Government Per-
formance and Results Act (1993) was instrumental in in-
troducing results-based performance assessment for US
government agencies and contractors. Successive Amer-
ican governments have continued and expanded this
practice, including the Government Performance and Re-
sults Modernization Act (2010) of the Obama adminis-
tration. Similarly, the World Health Organization ([WHO]
2008, p. 2) states that ‘performance measurement seeks
to monitor, evaluate and communicate the extent to
which various aspects of the health system meet their
key objectives….Health relates both to the health out-
comes secured after treatment and to the broader health
status of the population’.
Despite the popularity of performance measure-
ments across a multitude of governance sectors, ranging
from health, development and finance to security, the
assessment of results faces many problems and pitfalls.
Alan Fowler (1996, pp. 58–59) identifies five problems
for results-based performancemeasurement. Firstly, the
greater the number of actors that are interested or in-
volved in the provision of a service, the greater the di-
versity of views on what is needed and how a service
should be supplied. Secondly, external influences and
factors distort service outcomes in such a way that re-
sults cannot be directly and exclusively attributed to the
provision and provider of specific services. Thirdly, ‘the
time scales over which results can be seen or measured
tend to increasewhenmoving fromoutputs to outcomes
and then to impacts’ (Fowler, 1996, p. 59). Fourthly,
whether a service is relevant and suitable for attaining
specific results often rests on general assumptions about
linear causal relationships between service inputs and
outcomes which contradict the complexity of many is-
sues (Fowler, 1996). Finally, the further one moves from
tangible service outputs towards outcomes the greater
the role of intangible intervening factors. In sum, the se-
lection and definition of performance targets and indica-
tors is neither simple nor clear.
3. Measuring Security and Health
The problems of performance measurement are exac-
erbated by the intangible, socially constructed and con-
tested nature of the intended outcomes in many fields
of global governance. How do we define and measure
security, health or development? Security, for example,
can be conceptualized in different ways. The most com-
mon understanding of security is as a condition involving
a ‘low probability of damage’ (Baldwin, 1997, p. 13). An-
other definition of security refers to subjective percep-
tions of safety or the emotional state of freedom from
anxiety (Rothschild, 1995, p. 61).
Each definition suggests different security outcomes
and each faces distinct assessment problems. The sta-
tistical measurement of security as low probability of
harmor damage is themost problematic, despite appear-
ing to be closest to a definition of security as outcome.
Probabilities can only be established over a long period,
which may go beyond individual contracts. In addition,
it appears unrealistic to demand that service providers
achieve pre-defined probabilities of damage when many
extraneous factors influence the level of security which
are not under their control. For the same reason, it is dif-
ficult to attribute security outcomes to specific actors. If
the frequency of harm decreases, it may be as much due
to the interventions of a security provider as an attacker’s
change of strategy.
The definition and assessment of security in terms of
popular perceptions seems to be able to overcome some
of these performance assessment problems. It appears
possible to measure and set specific targets for pub-
lic security perceptions, which providers should achieve
within the timeframe of their contracts. A government
or international organization could, for instance, require
that 80% of the local citizens feel safe. To attribute lower
levels of anxiety to the provider citizens could also be
asked whether and to what degree they believe specific
security services, such as guarding and security checks
at airports, are effective. The main problem with this
definition and measure is that perceptions may vary in-
dependently of both security provision and probability
of harm. The increased presence of security guards may
contribute to feelings of insecurity, instead of alleviating
them. Canvassing public opinions on security provider
performance can thus lead to assessments that directly
contradict those based on a definition of security as low
probability of damage.
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Similar problems can be observed with regard to the
definition and measurement of public health. What is
health and how can it be assessed? The WHO has used
two divergent conceptualizations of health which mirror
those of security (Mathers, Salomon, Murray, & Lopez,
2003; Salomon et al., 2003). One conceptualizes health
as average disability adjusted life years (DALYs). Based on
statistical data, DALYs define health, or rather the burden
of bad health, in terms of ‘the sum of the Years of Life
Lost (YLL) due to premature mortality in the population
and the Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for people liv-
ing with the health condition or its consequences’ (Math-
ers et al., 2003, p. 320; WHO, 2016). The second concept
defines health in terms of aggregate perceptions of per-
sonal ‘states or conditions of functioning of the human
body and mind’, including but not necessarily limited to
domains such as vision, hearing, affect, pain, sexual func-
tioning, mobility, dexterity, cognition, digestion, skin and
disfigurement, etc. (Salomon et al., 2003, pp. 303, 309).
Moreover, the same problems with timeliness, attribu-
tion andmeasurability affect the assessment of health as
an outcome of governance interventions, as seen in the
case of security. This includes the questions of whether
specific health services are indeed effective, whether
subjective perceptions of health are supported or under-
mined by specific interventions and whether general im-
provements in health are indeed due to the provision of
specific health services.
The conceptualization of security and health as ac-
tivities, capabilities and interventions avoids these prob-
lems. These indicators can be immediately observed,
quantitatively or qualitatively measured, and exclusively
attributed to a single service provider. The literature on
security, for instance, has defined security in terms of ac-
tivities, such as prevention, deterrence, protection, re-
silience, pre-emption and avoidance (Krahmann, 2008,
p. 383, 2011, pp. 368-371). Similarly, the World Bank
(2002, p. 5) denotes public health as interventions de-
signed to control and prevent disease, including ‘surveil-
lance and control of risks and damages in public health;
Management of communicable and non-communicable
diseases; Health promotion; Behavior change interven-
tions for disease prevention and control; Social partici-
pation and empowerment of citizens in health; Reducing
the impact of emergencies and disasters on health’.
To be sure, the definition and assessment of secu-
rity and health in terms of activities, capabilities and in-
terventions leads to clear and seemingly objective tar-
gets. Security and health interventions can easily be spec-
ified, e.g. ‘carry out security patrols every hour’ or ‘vacci-
nate 80% of the population’. However, these tasks rep-
resent outputs and not outcomes. As the next section
will argue, they implicitly assume causal connections be-
tween activities, capabilities and interventions and the
intended outcomes which are socially constructed and
vary among socio-cultural contexts. Patrols can some-
times deter threats, while at other times they only dis-
place them in space or time. Vaccination can have unin-
tended side effects or encourage populations to engage
in more risky behaviour. In short, the focus on activities,
capabilities and interventions replaces ‘outcomes’ with
‘performative acts’.
4. From Performance to Performativity
The notion of ‘performativity’ and associated ‘perfor-
mative acts’ has been developed, among others, by Ju-
dith Butler in her analysis of sex and gender. Butler
(1988, 1990) argues that gender identities are consti-
tuted through repetitive performative acts and not bio-
logical or social conditioning. Such repetitive acts range
from the daily wearing of corsets in Victorian times to
mannerisms. Performative acts shape the material body
of the performer so that it conforms to shared ideas of
gender and influences the perceptions of the audience
with regards to the performer’s gender identity. Perfor-
mative acts do not only create gender, they are also fun-
damental to the social construction and production of
other concepts and entities, such as air space (Williams,
2011). Several authors have analysed howperformativity
underpins security (e.g. Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Brassett
& Vaughn-Williams, 2015).
The most comprehensive application of the concept
of performativity to security can be found in Higate and
Henry’s (2009, 2010) analysis of UN peacekeeping. Their
research illustrates that performative acts produce secu-
rity outcomes. However, whether and how performative
acts influence levels of harm or subjective perceptions
of security is by no means pre-determined. Higate and
Henry observe two componentswhich influence the ‘suc-
cess’ of performative acts in creating perceptions and ex-
periences of security. The first component is the ‘chore-
ographed drama’ and theatre-like performances, based
on the repetitive re-enactment of specific activities (Hi-
gate&Henry, 2010, p. 42). Higate andHenry (2009, p. 99)
write that ‘audiences express perceptions of security and
insecurity as they appraise the credibility of security per-
formance played out before them’. The persuasiveness
of these performances in the eyes of clients, the public
or potential attackers rests on the repetitive enactment
of military expertise and prowess in the form of security
practices such as drills, patrols and security checks (Hi-
gate & Henry, 2009, p. 99).
The second component of security as a performa-
tive act is the presentation and use of certain capabili-
ties as ‘props’ to lend persuasiveness and legitimacy to
a security performance (Higate & Henry, 2009, p. 114).
In the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia, Higate and
Henry (2009, p. 114—italics in the original) observed that
‘equipment was often used as the key criterion for secu-
rity performance and, in turn, the creation of safe space’.
Zaiotti (2011, p. 543) adds a third condition for the
productive capabilities of performative acts by arguing
that cultural and historical practices influence which ac-
tivities are associated with certain identities, material-
ities and experiences. Audiences interpret practices as
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contributing to security only if they conform to pre-
existing socio-cultural ideas of ‘security’, activities and
capabilities. Performativity works within ideational and
normative contexts that ‘precede, constrain, and exceed
the performer’ (Butler, as cited in Zaiotti, 2011, p. 543).
The theory of performativity contributes in two
ways to our understanding of what happens when per-
formance measurement focusses on performative acts.
Firstly, it suggests that activities, capabilities and inter-
ventions are not only selected as performance measures
because they are more easily observed and attributed
to service providers than the actual outcomes of these
performative acts. Rather, it contends that the definition
of security and health as performative acts represents
a distinct conceptualization which assumes that activi-
ties, capabilities and interventions are already what they
seek to achieve. As Butler (1990, p. 25) writes “There
is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender;
that identity is performatively constituted by the very
‘expressions’ that are said to be its results”. According
to a performative definition, deterrence and protection
mean security; vaccination and consultations represent
health. These definitions are not only embraced for prac-
tical reasons but also connote a different understanding
of security and health as ‘outcomes’. Actors who make
performative definitions of security and health the basis
of their performance assessments thus fail to see the con-
tingent and socially constructed relationship between
repetitive performative acts and its material and imma-
terial effects on security and health.
Secondly and related to the above, the observation
that performative acts operate (only) within pre-existing
ideas and norms about ‘appropriate’ security activities
or health interventions suggests the possibility of a prob-
lematic disconnect between the global governance ac-
tors who define performance tasks and the local popu-
lations who are the intended beneficiaries of these in-
terventions. The global governance administrators and
providers who select specific activities, capabilities and
interventions to promote security and health may have
little understanding of how these will be interpreted and
understood within foreign contexts with serious implica-
tions for their effectiveness and legitimacy. Importantly,
this observation goes beyond the argument that secu-
rity and health interventions may have unintended con-
sequences (e.g. Fowler, 1996, p. 59). It highlights instead
the socially constructed nature of performance indica-
tors as well as the socially constructed nature of local re-
actions to global security and health interventions. The
next two sections illustrate the move from performance
to performativity in the cases of private security contract-
ing and NGO health service provision during the global
governance intervention in Afghanistan.
5. Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan
Performance arguments have played a central role in
justifying the outsourcing of military and security ser-
vices in global governance to private contractors (Krah-
mann, 2010; Stanger, 2009). This outsourcing has so far
been the most pronounced during the intervention in
Afghanistan. Between 2008 and 2012, the number of
private security guards contracted with the US DoD in-
creased more than tenfold from 2,745 to 28,686 (CENT-
COM, 2014). Disconcertingly, about 90% of security con-
tractors were armed (Schwartz, 2011, p. 2). The DoD
has sought to legitimize the outsourcing of security by
means of performance targets and measures. The US
Army Handbook Developing a Performance Work State-
ment [PWS] in a Deployed Environment (US Army, 2009,
p. 4; hereafter PWS Handbook) thus praises the benefits
of performancemeasurements, arguing that they ensure
that the ‘government pays for results, not activity’.
However, the intervention in Afghanistan demon-
strates that DoD contracts and assessments usually de-
fine security outcomes in terms of performative activi-
ties and capabilities. In the minds of contracting officials,
these performative acts comply with the ‘increased fo-
cus on intended results, not processes’ because they are
equated with outcomes (US Army, 2009, p. 9). More-
over, these performative acts can be assessed in terms
of visible, quantifiable and attributable performance in-
dicators. The PWS Handbook (US Army, 2009, p. 22),
thus, instructs contracting units to develop performance
tasks which meet the SMART test, i.e. they must be spe-
cific, measurable, attainable, relevant and timely. In ad-
dition, the PWS Handbook (US Army, 2009, p. 26) iden-
tifies five methods for monitoring: random sampling, pe-
riodic sampling, one hundred percent inspection, trend
analysis, and customer feedback. Repetitive performa-
tive acts, capabilities or interventions fit all but the last
of these methods.
That a performative definition of security is not
merely a matter of convenience, but of conviction is il-
lustrated by the way in which the DoD formulates perfor-
mance tasks for security contractors in Afghanistan. The
PWS for Private Security Services at CampBravo, Forward
Operating Base Heredia in Afghanistan, for example, de-
fines performance tasks either as actions, e.g. ‘searching
personnel and vehicles’ and ‘periodic checking of interior
perimeter’ or as capabilities and equipment, e.g. ‘ammu-
nition’ and ‘AK-47’ (CENTCOM, 2012, p. 2). Similarly, the
PWS for Counter-Narcoterrorism (CNT) states: ‘The Con-
tractor shall provide security and related services in sup-
port of CNT and CNT related missions to include, but not
limited to, intelligence,medical, logistics, canine services,
surveillance, counter surveillance, aerial over watch, se-
curity advisory etc’. (DoD, 2007, p. 19). Occasional ref-
erences to the purpose of performative acts such as
to ‘deny the introduction of unauthorized weapons or
contraband, to prevent theft of US Government Prop-
erty and to ensure only authorized personnel gain ac-
cess’ imply that the specified tasks refer to results, even
if these are not measured by performance assessments
(CENTCOM, 2012, p. 2). The demand for a repetitive re-
enactment of these security activities and capabilities is
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another characteristic of DoD performance tasks which
denotes their performative nature. A CENTCOM (2009)
solicitation for ‘Armed Security Guards/Private Security
Providers’ in Afghanistan thus requires that ‘Contrac-
tor(s) must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week’.
US Army criteria for evaluating the performance of
security contractors serve as further illustrations of the
shift from performance outcomes to performative acts
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006, p. 25).
These criteria measure performance in terms of: 1) activ-
ities, such as ‘denying access’, ‘appropriate conduct’, ‘re-
sponse to incidents of employee misconduct’, ‘working
with the Army organization’, 2) capabilities, such as ‘re-
quired level of guard coverage’ and ‘ability to respond
to duty changes’, and 3) the characteristics of contrac-
tors, such as ‘responsiveness, alertness, physical fitness,
courtesy’ and ‘proper appearance’ (GAO, 2006, p. 25).
They refer to only a single result, namely that contractors
should contribute to the ‘positive image’ of the armed
forces. Yet, the formulation of these criteria and the use
of verbs such as; ‘achieve’, ‘maintain’, ‘manage’ and ‘con-
trol’, suggests that they are believed to represent security
outcomes (GAO, 2006, p. 25).
The implications of defining security in terms of per-
formative acts are considerable. Firstly, this definition
prevents a critical assessment of the socially constructed
effects of performative security acts. Such an assessment
includes, but should not be limited to, investigations of
whether the activities and capabilities of private security
contractors contribute to lowering probabilities of harm
or increasing perceptions of security among mission per-
sonnel and the local Afghan population. It must be noted
that how an audience interprets and reacts to performa-
tive acts depends on pre-existing socio-cultural ideas. Ac-
tions and contractor characteristics, which in some social
situations and environments contribute to lower levels
of harm or subjective feelings of security, can lead to in-
creased violence or perceptions of insecurity in others.
Secondly, the definition of security in terms of spe-
cific, attainable, measurable, attributable and observ-
able performative acts determines in a very particu-
lar way how PSCs have operated in Afghanistan. The
Statement of Work for the private security contractor at
Camp Bravo (CENTCOM, 2012), for example, stipulates
exactly who should be employed (‘indigenous person-
nel’), what kinds of weapons must be used (‘M9, M4,
M16, or equivalent’), what equipment the contractor
must carry (e.g. ‘protective body armor, helmets, uni-
forms, secure communications’) and what activities they
must carry out (e.g. ‘Searching personnel and vehicles
entering and leaving the installations’, ‘Manning Guard
Towers, Checkpoints and other static positions 24 hours
a day, 7-days a week’, ‘checking of the interior perime-
ter defenses’). DoD notions of suitable security perfor-
mances, thus, shape which activities and capabilities are
provided and which are excluded from contracts, per-
formancemeasurements and implementation strategies,
despite potentially beneficial effects for the security per-
ceptions, risk levels and relationships of the mission and
host societies.
6. NGOs and Public Heath Care in Afghanistan
Performance measurements have also become impor-
tant for legitimizing the activities of NGOs in global gov-
ernance, including the delivery of public health services
(Fowler, 1996; Lynch-Cerullo & Clooney, 2011; Spar &
Dail, 2002). When in 2002 the new Afghan Ministry of
Public Health (MoPH) and major international donors,
such as the European Union, USAID and the World
Bank, decided to outsource essential health care to
NGOs the World Bank emerged as a leading advocate
of performance-based contracting to demonstrate effec-
tiveness, ensure public accountability and obtain legit-
imacy (Sondorp et al., 2009, p. 141). The World Bank
argued that performance rather than input-based con-
tracting would give NGOs the ‘freedom to reach their
targets using creative solutions adapted to local situa-
tions while keeping efficiency and effectiveness in mind’
(World Bank, 2013).
In practice, however, the World Bank’s collaboration
with NGOs has been characterized by a focus on perfor-
mative acts. For example, the targets within the ‘Basic
Package of Health Services’ (BPHS) set by the MoPH on
the advice of theWHOadopted a performative definition
of health which equated interventions with outcomes
(MoPH, 2003, 2005). The observation that Afghanistan
‘faced some of the worst health statistics ever recorded
worldwide, including an infant mortality rate of 165 per
1,000 live births and 1,600 maternal deaths for every
100,000 live births’ thus resulted in performance tasks
definedby comprehensive list of services (MoPH, 2005, p.
1; see also Cashin et al., 2015, p. 9). Although the MoPH
(2005, p. 4) asserted that the BPHS would consider the
question ‘Do the services proposed have an impact on
themajor health problems?’ the contingent and variable
relationship between the performance of health services
and health outcomes was not reconsidered once these
lists had been drawn up.
Since 2003, the World Bank has extended its per-
formative conception of health to NGOs contracted to
implement the BPHS in up to 31 out of 34 Afghan
provinces.2 The ‘Balanced Scorecard’, developed by the
World Bank in collaboration with the MoPH, Johns Hop-
kins University and the Indian Institute of Health Man-
agement Research, has assessed performance ‘results’
in terms of: (1) capabilities, e.g. facilities, number of fe-
male staff, equipment, availability of laboratory tests and
drugs, (2) administration, e.g. record taking and training
plans, and (3) interventions, e.g. number of household
2 Due to the streamlining of funding for health care through the System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition program from 2013–2018, the
performance-based contracting approach was expanded to include funds from other donors, who had previously managed their own contracts with
NGOs. See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/12/22/afghanistan-builds-capacity-meet-healthcare-challenges
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visits, consultations, vaccinations, and antenatal care
(Cashin et al., 2015, Annex 1). NGOs have received addi-
tional ‘results-based’ payments if the aggregate number
of health interventions exceeded those of the previous
year by more than 10% (Cashin et al., 2015, p. 11). Public
health outcomes, such as the services’ impact on DALYs
or subjective perceptions of health and health service
quality, have not been monitored, despite extensive and
costly verification measures which, amongst other per-
formance criteria, cross-checked the number of reported
interventions through household surveys (Cashin et al.,
2015, p. 10).
As in the case of security, two main consequences
have emerged from the performative approach to health
care in Afghanistan. One has been a shift of focus away
from public health outcomes. A national mortality sur-
vey carried out in 2010 did indeed report improvements
in public health indicators, including life expectancy, in-
fant mortality and maternity deaths (MoPH, 2011). How-
ever, the performative approach to health adopted by
the World Bank has precluded a critical assessment of
the services supplied through the BPHS and their socially-
mediated effects on these and other health outcomes.
The observation that ‘service utilization had plateaued
and in some cases decreased in 2009’, including vacci-
nation rates, raises questions over whether the perfor-
mative health services provided by NGOs in Afghanistan
havemet the socially constructed notions of suitable and
relevant health interventions for the Afghan population
(Cashin et al., 2015, p. 11).
The analysis further problematizes the dominant role
played by international donors and organizations in the
definition of ‘appropriate’ performative acts in the field
of public health. Several NGOs, including Médecins Sans
Frontières, Médecins du Monde and the International
Committee of the Red Cross, decided to opt out of the
bidding process for health service provision because they
felt that the objectives adopted by the donors were ‘con-
tradictory to their neutrality and independence man-
dates’ (Bousquet, 2005, p. 16). Although the Afghan
MoPH agreed to and implemented the performative ap-
proach to health care, its policies were largely shaped
by the interests and health care conceptions of inter-
national donors, organizations and consultants and not
those of the Afghan population (MoPH, 2003, 2005).
7. Conclusion
Output legitimacy, derived from performance assess-
ments and performance-based contracting, is an impor-
tant standard for global governance. The outsourcing of
global governance to private actors such as NGOs, PSCs
and transnational corporations has drawn specifically on
this strategy to gain legitimacy and public approval. How-
ever, in many cases, the attainment of publicly desired
outcomes as a measure of performance has been re-
placed with a focus on performative acts, i.e. the specifi-
cation and assessment of contractors’ capabilities, char-
acteristics and repetitive enactments of specific activities
and interventions.
This article has sought to provide a theoretical ex-
planation and an empirical illustration of the shift from
performance to performativity through the examples of
security and health care provision. It has been argued
that the implications of this shift for the conceptualiza-
tion, and implementation, of global governance inter-
ventions are considerable. As illustrated by the exam-
ple of the global security and health governance inter-
ventions in Afghanistan, two consequences stand out.
First, a performative definition of public services which
equates performative acts with outcomes precludes a
critical assessment of the actual effects of these inter-
ventions. Second, since international rather than local
actors determine the definition of what constitutes ‘suit-
able’ performative acts, this conceptualization leads to a
systematic disregard for the socially constructed nature
of performative acts. Performative acts only ‘work’, i.e.
achieve desired outcomes, if they conform to existing so-
cial expectations.
In conclusion, the preceding developments logically
undermine the attempts to legitimize private actors in
global governance through performance-based contract-
ing and performance assessments because these mea-
sures neither examine outcomes nor consider their so-
cial desirability and acceptance. It follows that we need
to look at performance assessments through new eyes,
not only in security and health but also within other
fields of global governance. Further research will be nec-
essary to investigate the local and international con-
sequences of this development for global security and
health interventions in more detail and to establish
whether and under what circumstances its findings also
apply to other global governance actors and sectors.
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